A modal logic is developed to deal with nite ordered binary trees as they are used in (computational) linguistics. A modal language is introduced with operators for the`mother of',` rst daughter of' and`second daughter of' relations together with their transitive re exive closures. The relevant class of tree models is de ned and three linguistic applications of this language are discussed: context free grammars, command relations, and trees decorated with feature structures. An axiomatic proof system is given for which completeness is shown with respect to the class of nite ordered binary trees. A n umber of decidability results follow.
of trees in such systems is to ignore some of the most interesting issues. Moreover, many syntactic theories (notably Chomsky's Government and Binding (GB) theory, probably the dominant contemporary syntactic paradigm ) are rmly tree based. If the insights of such frameworks are to be reconciled with the insights of uni cation tradition, it seems important to extend the model theoretic perspective to the role played by nite trees.
Some recent papers have made a start in this direction. Rogers and VijayShankar (1992) and Vijay-Shankar (1992) propose various languages for describing trees. Their motivation is to combine insights from the Tree Adjoining Grammar and Uni cation traditions. Kracht (1993a) uses a modal`orientation language' over the parse trees of context free grammars to relate GB and GPSG. Finally, Blackburn, Gardent and Meyer-Viol (1993) introduce a modal language for talking about trees, and, by`layering' this language across a feature logic, give an account of some of the leading ideas of GPSG.
The present paper builds on Blackburn, Gardent and Meyer-Viol (1993). We discuss two linguistic ontologies, namely nite ordered binary trees, andnite ordered binary trees bred over feature structures, f o r m ulate languages for talking about them, and prove a n umber of results. We proceed as follows. In the rst section we introduce nite ordered binary trees and a simple modal language L for talking about them. In the second section we outline three linguistic applications of L: talking about the parse trees of context free languages, talking about GB command relations, and, by`layering' L across a feature logic, modeling aspects of GPSG. In the third section the technical work begins: we i n troduce and discuss an axiomatisation of the logic of nite ordered binary trees, and in the fourth section prove it to be complete. In the fth section we discuss some of the consequences of this completeness result, notably the decidability of the logic, and, building on the work of Finger and Gabbay (1992) , the decidability of the`layered language'. We close the paper by noting a number of directions for future work. 1 The language L and its semantics Trees can be found on the pages of most syntax textbooks they are an important part of the ontologies posited in most grammatical theories. In this section we isolate a linguistically important class of trees, namely the nite ordered binary trees together with a collection of unary relations, and de ne a simple modal language L for talking about it.
First some terminology. We assume that the reader knows what a nite tree is, and that such locutions as`a node w 1 immediately dominates node w 2 ', or equivalently`w 1 is the mother of w 2 ' or equivalently`w 2 is a daughter of w 1 ' are understood. Next, certain special tree nodes are important. Every tree has a unique node called the root which has the property that it is not the daughter of any node. Moreover, a non-empty subset of the nodes of any nite tree are terminal nodes, that is, nodes without daughters. A tree is a binary tree if no node in the tree immediately dominates more than two nodes.
In linguistics trees are typically thought of as ordered. For binary trees this means the following: the daughters of any node (of which there are at most two) are uniquely classi ed as being either the rst daughter or the second daughter. We think of the rst daughter as preceding the second daughter (if in fact there is a second daughter) and when nite ordered binary trees are drawn this is conventionally represented by placing the rst daughter to the left of the second.
Such nite ordered binary trees lie at the heart of much syntactic analysis. We will usually present them as tuples of the form hW 1 2 root i:
Here W is a nite, non-empty set, the set of tree nodes ( W) c o n tains all and only the tree's terminal nodes and root is the (unique) root node of the tree. As for 1 This presentation of nite ordered binary trees enables us to recover four other binary relations we will make heavy use of, namely , , and . We de ne to be 1 2 , thus w w 0 means that w 0 is a daughter of w. We de ne to be the converse relation of , thus w w 0 means that w 0 is the mother of w. Note that is a partial function that is de ned on all nodes except root. As to and , they are the re exive transitive closures of and respectively. Sometimes it is convenient t o m a k e some of these de ned relations explicit in our presentations. For example, when de ning satisfaction it will be natural to present nite ordered binary trees O as tuples of the form hW 1 2 root i:
Finite ordered binary trees are clearly Kripke frames, but how d o e s s y n tactic theory give rise to Kripke models? The answer is not hard to nd. Linguists annotate trees with further information. For example, nodes may be marked by the symbols S, NP or VP, indicating that they are sentential nodes, noun phrase nodes, or verb phrase nodes respectively. Indeed nodes often bear multiple annotations. For instance, a noun phrase node might be marked +N, BAR-2 and CASE-GENITIVE. In short, the structures underlying much linguistic theorising can be seen as nite ordered binary trees together with a collection of unary relations on the tree n o des, and such structures are Kripke models. Incidentally, while trees are used by a wide range of grammatical theories, di erent theories typically use di erent unary relations. Thus the frames we have isolated are common to many theories, but the models built over them will vary. Now that we k n o w the structures we're interested in, how shall we talk about them? In this paper we explore the use of propositional modal language called L. 1 The primitive alphabet of L(Prop) consists of following items: a non-empty set of propositional symbols Prop, a truth functionally adequate collection of Boolean operators, ve primitive unary`diamond' modalities # 1 , # 2 , ", # and " , and the punctuation symbols ( and ). For any c hoice of Prop, the w s of L(Prop) are built up in the usual way: all elements of Prop are w s if and w s, then so are : , ( ^ ), # 1 , # 2 , " , # and " and nothing else is a w . We normally suppose that some choice of Prop has been xed and speak simply of the language L.
We use a number of de ned modalities. Firstly, we de ne a new unary diamond by stipulating that # is to be # 1 _ # 2 . Second, we de ne the dual box' operators to our diamonds in the usual fashion: + 1 is de ned to be :# 1 : , + 2 is de ned to be :# 2 : , + is de ned to be :#: , * is de ned to be :": , + is de ned to be :# : , and * is de ned to be :" : . Third, we de ne two n ullary modalities (or constants) as follows: s is de ned to be *? and t is de ned to be +?. We sometimes call # 1 , # 2 , # and " basic operators.
This language can talk about trees in linguistically interesting ways. The atomic symbols of Prop will enable us to talk about node labels. Intuitively, an atomic symbol (say, NP) will be true at a node i that node is labeled with the corresponding property (that is, i it is a noun phrase node). The modal operators are to`move us round' the trees in a natural manner: # 1 and # 2 will look for information at rst and second daughters respectively, " will look for information at mothers, and # and " will explore the`dominates' and`is dominated by' relations respectively.
Let's make this precise. The standard interpretation for our language is in terms of Kripke models built over arbitrary Kripke frames of the form hW R 1 R 2 R R R i that is, frames with a transition relation for each m o d a l i t y. However, because we are interested in linguistic applications, we are only interested in models built over frames O = hW 1 If M w j = then we s a y is true in M at w, o r is satis ed in M at w. For any w , if there is a model M a n d a n o d e w in M such that M w j = , then we s a y t h a t is satis able. If is true at all nodes in a model M then we s a y it is valid in the model M. The notion of validity in a model has an important role to play for us. As discussed in the next section, we think of grammars G as L w s G . The trees admitted by the grammar are precisely those models in which G is valid. Another important concept is validity: if a w is valid in all models then we s a y i t i s valid and write j = .
The satisfaction de nition clearly captures the intended interpretation of L.
Also, note what the de ned operators mean. In particular, note that: That is, s and t are constants true at only the root node and terminal nodes respectively, while # looks for information at daughter nodes. Other useful de ned operators abound, for L is very expressive o ver its intended models. For example, we can de ne the universal modality: U] = def " (s+ ). This says that is true at all points in a model, thus the modality allows universal constraints on grammatical well-formedness to be stated in the object language see Blackburn and Spaan (1993) for further discussion.
Before considering applications, there is an aspect of L's semantics that is worth discussing, namely the way w e have restricted our discussion to binary trees. Actually, from a logical point of view the important p o i n t is not that our trees are binary, but that there is a xed upper bound on their branch factor.
We could easily extend L to permit third daughters, fourth daughters, : : : , n-th daughters to be talked about using unary operators # 3 , # 4 , : : : , # n , and the results of this paper generalise straightforwardly to such extensions. However if we d o not have a xed upper bound, matters are di erent. We brie y discuss the issue in the paper's conclusion. Linguistically the restriction to binary trees is reasonable, though not uncontroversial. In GB (see Chomsky (1981) ) binary branching trees are widely considered to be fundamental. On the other hand, most versions of GPSG (see Gazdar et al (1985) ) regard co-ordinations as` at'. For example,`John and Sue and Bill and Lou and Butch and Peggy-Sue' would be represented by a node with six daughters. As no upper bound can be placed on the number of conjuncts, such v ersions of GPSG place no upper bound on the branch factor.
Three linguistic applications
The aim of this section is to give the reader a taste of L in action. We give three examples. First we s h o w that L can pick out the parse trees of any c o n text free phrase structure grammar. Second we show that L can express many of thè command relations' used in GB. Third, we combine L with a`feature logic' in a particularly simple fashion. The resulting`layered language' enables some of the more important ideas of GPSG to be captured.
Context free grammars
We s h o w here how to construct L formulas that will distinguish the parse trees of a given context free grammar from all other models. Strictly speaking, we o n l y show h o w to capture the parse trees of any context free grammar that rewrites no symbol to more than two symbols. However, as far as weak generative capacity is concerned, nothing is lost for any context free language can be generated by a grammar in Chomsky Normal Form, and such grammars have this property.
Moreover, it will be clear from our discussion that by adding to L nitely many of the operators # 3 , # 4 , : : : , # n;1 , # n mentioned in the previous section, any context free grammar whatsoever can be handled directly.
So suppose G = hS N T P iis a context free grammar with start symbolS, set of non-terminal symbols N, set of terminal symbols T , and set of productions P. We can assume that all these sets are nite and that N, T and fSg are pairwise disjoint. Our goal is to de ne a w G that is valid on all and only the parse trees of the grammar G.
The rst step is to specify our modal language that is, to nd a suitable choice of Prop. For any context free grammar G there is an obvious choice. If the grammar contains no epsilon productions (that is, the grammar rewrites no symbol to the null string), take Prop to be N T f Sg. On the other hand, if the grammar contains epsilon productions choose some distinct new symbol and take Prop to be N T f Sg f g. The next step is to capture the e ect of the productions in G. As i M is (isomorphic to) a parse tree for G. The most important point to note about this logical reconstruction of G is the way that something essentially procedural (namely rewrite rules on strings) have been turned into something declarative (namely a collection of axioms regulating the local structure of parse trees). This is not a new idea in linguistics. It is standard in both GB and GPSG to insist that phrase structure`rewrite rules' should not be thought of as operations on strings (or indeed, as operations at all) but rather as node admissibility conditions on trees. In GB this is a consequence of the idea that representations, not rules, are fundamental. In GPSG it is a consequence of an explicitly model theoretic stance towards syntactic theorising: the primary task facing the linguist is to construct a l ogical theory characterising precisely those structures exhibited by grammatical sentences. How these structures are to be constructed is an interesting, but separate, concern.
It's also worth remarking that even the idea of turning rewrite rules into modal axioms is not novel: essentially the same thing was done by McCawley in 1968. McCawley doesn't use the terminology of modal logic, nonetheless the heart of his insight is that the rewrite arrow of formal language theory can be regarded as a modal operator interpreted over tree based Kripke models. Thus our choice of a modal language for talking about trees was not capricious. Modal operators arise quite naturally in the transition from the`rule based' perspective on linguistic structure to the declarative model theoretic perspective, a theme that recurs in contemporary work on feature logic.
Command relations
The tree relations we h a ve been considering are rather conventional. The`mother of' and`daughter of' relations, together with their transitive closures, are fundamental relations that occur in practically any research area concerned with trees. However many linguistic frameworks, and in particular GB, work with a m uch r i c her collection of tree relations. Perhaps the prime examples of such relations are the command relations of GB. Intuitively, command relations deal with the sphere of in uence of syntactic mechanisms, and they play an essential role in various components of GB theory. Here we will investigate how L copes with command relations. Our point of departure is the de nition given by Barker and Pullum (1990) .
De nition 2.1 (Command Relations on Tree Models) Let M be a m o del and P be a unary relation on the nodes of M. The P-command relation C P on M is de ned a s fhw vi : 8k(k 6 = w & k w & k 2 P ) k v)g.
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P is called the generating property of the command relation C P . The set fv 2 W : C P (w v)g is called the P-command domain of w in M. Note that because the P-command relations are de ned on trees, when C P (w v) holds in M, then all P-nodes properly dominating w dominate v and, consequently, the (unique) lowest such P-node dominates v. Conversely if the lowest P-node dominating w dominates v, then all P-nodes dominating w do. So the P-command domain of w is determined by the lowest P-node properly dominating w. By checking the de nition we see that, if P is the empty set or if P is the singleton set frootg, then the P command domain of w is the entire tree.
Given command relations C P , a r e t h e o b vious modalities corresponding to these relations expressible in L? To be more precise, it would be pleasant t o have a t our disposal for each P of interest a modality hPi with the following semantics:
The answer is`yes' whenever there is an L formula P which holds in M on all and only all nodes in P. For suppose we have such a f o r m ula P . Then it is clear that de ning hPi = def ** ((s _ P ) ! # ) has the required e ect. (The presence of s ensures that if no P node dominates the point o f e v aluation then the command domain will be the entire tree this is the approach adopted by Pullum and Barker.) The dual operator P] can also be de ned:
Because of the correspondence between the relations P and the w s P which pick them out, it is natural to use the L formulas themselves to label the modalities. That is, if is the w corresponding to P we will write h i rather than hPi . Using this`command modality' notation, here are some examples of expressible command relations:
1. h>i insists that holds in the smallest command domain of w, for C > (w v) i v is dominated by the mother of m. The terminology c-command is short for`in construction with' and plays an important role in the GB account of anaphoric binding the classic account i s Reinhart (1981) . For further discussion of S-command, Sentence command, see Barker and Pullum (1990) .
A full discussion of command relations would take us too far a eld (for a thorough investigation see Kracht (1992 Kracht ( , 1993a Kracht ( , 1993b )) but it is worth noting that a numberofthe characterizing properties of command relations discussed by Barker and Pullum follow straightforwardly from the semantics of our language. For example, consider the intersection property, which can be formulated as C _ = C \C : the intersection of command relations corresponds to union over their generating properties. This immediately follows from the fact that
When written in command modality notation this boils down to the fact that h _ i $ h i ĥ i is logically valid.
Trees decorated with feature structures
When linguists decorate trees they do not usually do so in the manner familiar from formal language theory. For example, when a linguist decorates a node with the information NP this is usually a way of insisting that it possesses a whole bundle of properties. Sometimes it is possible to represent this information bundle using only Boolean combinations of propositional variables, but for theories such as GPSG this would be most unnatural. GPSG envisages`atomic level information' as a structured entity, a so-called feature structure. The purpose of the present section is to show h o w the intuition concerning structured atomic information that underlies GPSG can be captured. First we de ne a standard notion of feature structure and present a language L F for talking about them. We then show h o w to`layer' L over L F , yielding a language L(L F ) capable of formulating the central ideas of GPSG in a natural way.
A feature structure is a labeled decorated directed graph. The elements of feature structures will be called points, and to say that feature structures are labeled directed graphs simply means that one can envisage the points being linked by arrows bearing a label. The most important constraint on feature structures concerns these labeled arrows: there is no point in any feature structure from which t wo distinct arrows bearing the same label emerges. In e ect, labeled arrows are representations of partial functions these partial functions are usually called features. As to the decorations, w e e n visage the points of feature structures being adorned with pieces of information of linguistic interest.
Let's make this precise. We assume that the linguistic theory we a r e w orking with tells us what features and decorations may b e used. That is, we assume that our linguistic theorising gives us a signature hF Di where both F and D are non-empty denumerable sets, the set of features and the set of decorations respectively. Typical elements of F might be case, number, person and agreement while typical elements of D might be genitive, singular, plural, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. We n o w de ne:
De nition 2.2 (Feature structures) A f e ature structure of signature hF Di is a triple F of the form hU fR f g f2F fQ d g d2D i, where U is a non-empty set for all f 2 F , R f is a binary relation on U that is a partial function and for each d 2 D , Q d is a unary relation on U.
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As we h a ve de ned them feature structures are multimodal Kripke models and indeed the language L F we n o w i n troduce will be the obvious modal language for talking about them, with the R f serving to interpret its modalities, and the Q d interpreting its propositional symbols. However we shall continue to call these entities feature structures, reserving the words`model' and`Kripke model' for the objects that interpret our language of trees L.
The language L F (of signature hF Di) contains the following items: all the elements of D (which we will regard as propositional symbols), a truth functionally adequate collection of Boolean connectives, and all the elements of F (which we will regard as one place modal operators). 2 The set of w s of L F is the smallest set containing all the propositional symbols (that is, all the elements of D) closed under the Boolean and modal operators (that is, the elements of F). Thus If F u j = then we s a y that is satis ed (or true) i n F at u. The most obvious de nition of validity i n L F is as follows: a w is valid i it is satis ed at all points in all feature structures. However, many feature structures are linguistically uninteresting, so we will con ne our attention to nite point-generated feature structures (or nite rooted feature structures). These are nite feature structures F that contain a point u 0 such t h a t a n y other point u of F can be reached by making a nite number of feature transitions from u 0 . (Such a p o i n t u 0 is said to generate F.) Thus an alternative de nition suggests itself: an L F w is valid i it is satis ed at all points in all nite, point generated feature structures. Actually, a s w e shall later see, both de nitions yield the same set of validities.
With L F and its semantics de ned, we are ready to de ne a language for talking about the structures underlying GPSG: trees decorated with feature structures. The language is called L(L F ), that is, the language L layered over the language L F , and it is de ned in a very simple way. We s i m p l y c hoose Prop to be L F and then construct the L w s over this base in the usual way. As a result, we've given an`internal structure' (namely, a modal structure) to the propositional symbolsofL. For further discussion see Blackburn, Gardent a n d Meyer-Viol (1993) .
Syntactically that's all there is to it what about the semantics? There is a straightforward interpretation for L(L F ) in terms of the following entities: De nition 2.3 (Feature decorated trees) B y a ( n i t e , o r dered, binary) feature structure decorated tree (of signature hF Di) is meant a triple hO Z z i where O is the presentation of a nite ordered binary tree, Z is a function that assigns to each node u of O a nite, point-generated feature structure (of signature hF Di), and z is a function that assigns to each node u of O a point z(u) 2 Z(u) that generates Z(u).
Two comments about feature decorated trees are in order. First of all, they seem to do justice to the ideas of GPSG. An examination of Gazdar et al (1985) suggests that they are a natural mathematical embodiment of the ontology underlying GPSG (modulo the fact that we are working only with binary trees). Second, in a number of recent talks Dov G a b b a y has emphasized the importance of` bred semantics' for combined logics. By a combined logic he means a layered language of the sort exempli ed by L(L F ) and feature decorated trees are a nice example of what he means by a bred semantics | the de nition bres a tree over a collection of feature structures. Finger and Gabbay (1992) gives a very clear and detailed account of such systems and proves a number of useful results which w e shall make use of later.
To i n terpret L(L F ) w s on feature structure decorated trees, all we h a ve t o do is alter the base clause of the satisfaction de nition for L. Let M = hO Z z i be a feature structure decorated tree, and w any n o d e i n O. Then for all L F w s , M w j = i Z(w) z (w) j = : If M (= hO Z z i) is a feature structure decorated tree, w is a node in O, is an L(L) F w and M w j = then we say that is satis ed (or true) i n M at w. If is satis ed at all nodes w of all feature structure decorated trees, then we s a y that is valid.
To sum up: when in the course of evaluating an L(L F ) w a t a n o d e w we encounter an L F w (that is, when we reach what used to be the`atomic' level) we jump into the feature structure associated with w (that is, Z(w)), and start evaluating the L F w at z(w). This atomic level change is the only change needed: the remaining clauses are those that were given in the satisfaction de nition for L. In short, the`top' layer of language L moves us round trees in the familiar way, while the`bottom' layer of language L F moves us round feature structures.
Having assembled the machinery, let's brie y discuss how GPSG puts it to work. One of the central insights of GPSG is that by making systematic use of the structured information embodied in feature structures, it is possible to give elegant accounts of many troublesome grammatical phenomena. First, context free rules in GPSG makes use of feature information. The GPSG analogue of V P ;! V NP (`A verb phrase is made up of a verb followed by a noun phrase') might be something like:
:noun^verbĥ baritwo ! # 1 (:noun^verbĥ barizero)# 2 (noun: verbĥ baritwo): For the purposes of the present discussion it is the form of this w that is important: the`outer' (or L) level of this w has the same form as the w s we used to capture the parse trees of context free grammars. But because of the`inner' (or L F ) level it reaches inside the feature structures and insists that certain conditions must hold there.
Secondly, and more interestingly, GPSG imposes a number of global restrictions on the way feature structures can be distributed over trees. The simplest of these is the foot feature principle. When a natural language is analysed GPSG style, certain information is classi ed as`foot information'. For a feature decorated tree to be acceptable, foot information must be`passed up' to the feature structure associated with the mother node. 3 This is essentially to demand the validity of the following L(L F ) w :
hfooti ! * h footi :
Now, every word in a GPSG lexicon is associated with feature information, that is, with an L F w . If a certain word bears foot information then the foot feature principle forces this information to trickle up the tree from any terminal node where the word is inserted. It is quite possible that this foot information is incompatible with other information present in the structure. If this happens the structure is judged`bad' that is, as not being the representation of a grammatical sentence. It is in this manner that`feature passing' allows more re ned accounts of grammaticality t o b e d e v eloped. In short, GPSG is essentially a collection of axioms stipulating which feature decorated trees correspond to grammatical structures and which do not. Some of the theory's constraints are essentially a generalisation of the idea of phrase structure grammars to the richer setting of feature decorated trees but in addition there is a set of global constraints, such as the foot feature convention, which act as a further lter on ungrammaticality. The way these various principles interact enables GPSG to give a neat account o f a v ariety of phenomena in a wide range of languages. Many of these principles can be formalised in L(L F ). For further discussion of GPSG from the present perspective see Blackburn, Gardent and Meyer-Viol (1993).
We close this section with a general warning. The reader should not conclude from our discussion that layered modal languages or feature structure decorated trees are all there is to modelling grammatical frameworks that make use of feature structures. This is simply false. For a start, di erent theories use feature structures in di erent w ays. For example, Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) (see Kaplan and Bresnan (1982) ) uses them to model grammatical relations such as subject and object, and Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) (see Pollard and Sag (1987) ) uses them for a wide variety o f t a s k s . Moreover, while both GPSG and LFG have composite ontologies made up of trees and feature structures, the theories`glue' these building blocks together di erently. Like GPSG, substantial parts of the LFG formalism can be viewed as a certain combination of modal logics but the combination in question is not the simple layering + bering idea embodied in L(L F ), and the resulting systems have very di erent logical properties.
The axiomatisation
In this section we present an axiomatisation of the logic of nite ordered binary trees. We will later prove that this axiomatisation (which w e call Lot) is complete. As axioms we take a n y suitable axiomatisation of propositional calculus, together with all instances of the schemas B1{B10, E1{E4, D1{D9 and F1{F3 below. As rules of inference we take modus ponens (if and ! are provable then so is ) and the rule of necessitation in + 1 , + 2 , *, + and * . That is, if is provable then so are + 1 , + 2 , * , + and * . Formal proofs are nite sequences of w s built using the axioms and rules of inference in the usual way. If a w is provable then we write` and say that is a theorem. With these generalities to hand, let us examine the details. The axioms split naturally into four groups. First of all, there are the axioms for the basic operators.
Most of this is familiar. B1{B3 are universally valid modal principles, while B4{B6 re ect the partial functional (or`deterministic') nature of the 1 , 2 and relations. B7 and B8 are familiar from tense logic: they record the fact that both the converse of 1 and the converse of 2 are contained in . B9 is closely related and says that the converse of is contained in 1 2 (to see this, recall that # is shorthand for # 1 _ # 2 ). Finally, B10 takes account o f the fact that in ordered binary trees, the existence of a 2 successor to some node entails the existence of a 1 successor to that same node. The next group of axioms deals with the transitive closure operators and their interactions with the basic operators.
These are familiar from temporal logic and Propositional Dynamic Logic see Goldblatt (1992) . They re ect the fact that and are the re exive transitive closures of and respectively.
The intended meaning of the de ned symbols was discussed in the introduction the next group of axiom pins these down: Finally we turn to the axioms that give the system its avour, namely those that re ect the fact that our intended models are all nite. F1 # t F2 " s F3 ! # ( + + : ) F1 and F2 are straightforward: no matter where we are in a nite tree we are only a nite number of steps away from the root node (which is what F1 says) and a nite number of steps away from at least one terminal node (which is what F2 says). More interesting is F3. Roughly speaking, it says that if holds at any n o d e i n a t r e e , then this node dominates a node not dominating any other nodes. It is this axiom that will enable us to maintain the niteness of the tree constructed in the completeness proof. As it plays such a crucial role, let's look at it more closely.
All instances of F3 are valid in our intended semantics. For suppose some w is true at a point w 1 in a model M. N o w, either w 1 dominates a distinct node w 2 such t h a t M w 2 j = , or this is not the case. If this is not the case then we are through: for it is immediate that M w 1 j = + + : , and as w 1 w 1 it follows that M w 1 j = # ( + + : ), and we h a ve v eri ed the consequent o f the axiom. So suppose that there is a point w 2 such t h a t w 1 6 = w 2 , w 1 w 2 , and M w 2 j = . Now w e ask: does w 2 dominate a distinct point w 3 such that M w 3 j = ? If the answer is`no' then it follows that M w 1 j = # ( + + : ) and we have v eri ed the consequent o f the axiom. On the other hand, if the answer is`yes', then we repeat the question, asking whether there is a distinct w 4 : : : in short, we keep asking whether or not there is a lower node that satis es , and as soon as we get the answer`no' we have our desired result. And we must eventually get the answer`no', for as we a r e w orking with nite trees, our original point w 1 dominates only nitely many n o d e s .
Note that all instances of ! " ( * * : ), the mirror image of F3, are also valid. However we don't need them as axioms: its an easy exercise to show that they are all derivable in Lot. This derivability of the mirror image re ects a fairly obvious fact about our models. When we look downwards in a tree we m a y see complex branching structure, and a special axiom (namely F3) is needed to cope with this. However when we l o o k u p wards we see a nice regular linear structure, and the deductive p o wer we already have copes successfully. 4 The discussion of this section has established that Lot is sound: the axioms are valid, and the rules of inference clearly preserve v alidity. We are ready to turn to the question of its completeness.
The completeness proof
We begin with the following observation: a completeness result for Lot must b e a w eak completeness result, for as we are working only over nite trees there is an obvious compactness failure. For example, let be fp "p ""p """p : : : g.
Any nite subset of has a model, but it is impossible to satisfy all the w s of in the same model.
In fact Lot is weakly complete and the proof falls into two parts. In the rst part (`Preliminaries') we de ne the basic entities we use to build our model, prove a number of results about them, and nally state and prove t h e Truth Lemma that we shall use. Much of this material is familiar from the literature on temporal logics for programs and Propositional Dynamic Logic. We h a ve g i v en fairly complete proof details, but occasionally the reader may nd it useful to consult Goldblatt (1992) or van Benthem and Meyer-Viol (to appear). In the subsequent part (`Building the model') we turn to the heart of the proof. The problem is this: we need to build a model, but this model must be based on a nite tree. An inductive construction suggests itself, but can it be shown to terminate after a nite number of steps? By making use of axiom F3 it is possible to guarantee this.
Preliminaries
The rst notion we need is that of a closure of a set of sentences. Recall that a set of sentences is said to be closed under subformulas i for all 2 , if i s a s u b f o r m ula of then 2 . We need to work with closures that o er more structure than just closure under subformulahood, thus, following Fisher and Ladner (1979) we de ne:
De nition 4.1 (Closures) If is a set of formulas, C l ( ) is de ned to be the smallest set of sentences containing that is closed under subformulas and satis es the following additional properties:
3. # 1 >, # 2 >, ">, " s and # t 2 C l ( ).
If 2 C l ( ) and is not of the form : then : 2 C l ( ). C l ( ) is called t h e closure of . Note that if is nite then C l ( ) is nite. 2
In fact, because of the failure of compactness already noted (and because our ultimate goal is to build a nite tree) we shall only be interested in nite The next two lemmas guarantee that we h a ve a plentiful supply of atoms, and that atoms have nice properties. Direct proofs of these facts are straightforward, or one can observe that analogues of these results are familiar properties of maximal consistent sets of sentences and use the previous lemma to transfer them to atoms. In the completeness proof that follows we shall work with closures of nite sets of sentences . Let us assume from now on that always denotes a nite set of sentences.
In the nite case At( ) has a very pleasant structure. We can enumerate all the singly negated formulas in C l ( ) as one list : 1 : : : : n (we call this the negative enumeration) and all the non-negated formulas in C l ( ) as another list 1 : : : n (we call this the positive enumeration), in such a way t h a t the i-th item on the negative e n umeration is the negation of the i-th item on the positive e n umeration. Note that for any formula in C l ( ) there is a formula i (1 i n) s u c h t h a t is logically equivalent t o i and i occurs on either the negative or positive e n umerations at the i-th place. De ne a pointwise selection from the negative a n d positive enumerations to be the result of choosing, for each i (1 i n), a w from one of the enumerations. Further, note that the conjunction of all the w s in a consistent pointwise selection is logically equivalent to the conjunction of all the w s in some atom, and conversely. Let C be At( ) together with these six relations.
2
C is not generally a tree nonetheless, as the following sequence of lemmas shows, it does have a n umber of useful properties. 5 Lemma 4. Proof: These results are standard, or simple variations on standard results.
1 and 2 are proved using B7 and B8 respectively in the manner familiar from tense logic 3 is a minor variation on this theme, making use of B9 and D3 while 4 follows immediately from 1 { 3. The proofs of 5 and 6 make use of E1{E4 in the standard fashion see Goldblatt (1992) 5 It is perhaps worth making an aside for readers familiar with the approach of Goldblatt (1992) . One can also regard C as arising by ltrating the canonical model this is Goldblatt's approach and it is probably the standard one. We h a ve a slight preference for the present approach (developed in detail in van Benthem and Meyer-Viol (to appear)) because it deals with nite structures right from the start. ). Now i f we suppose that # 2 h(w), then by Lemma 4.4 we have that either 2 h(w) o r ## 2 h(w). Taken together with the fact that O is a nite tree, this swiftly leads to contradiction (we l e a ve the argument t o the reader) we conclude that # 6 2 h(w) as required.
The arguments for " are similar. 
Building the model
With these preliminaries to hand we turn to the heart of the proof. Our task is to show that any consistent sentence is satis able. This is equivalent to showing that s# is satis able. Thus a natural strategy suggests itself.
Given a consistent sentence , f o r m At(fs# g), and inductively de ne a tree decorated by atoms from this set. First create a root node for the tree, and decorate it with any atom containing s# . If there are no formulas of the form # 1 or # 2 in the decorating atom, stop. Otherwise, create the needed daughter nodes, extend the decoration in the obvious way, and so on. Now this is the essence of what we'll do | but there is an obvious di culty to be overcome. Our task is to make a nite decorated tree, but how can we guarantee that the inductive procedure just sketched produces only nitely many nodes? It is here that axiom F3 comes into play. F3 will allow us to assign each atom a unique`level' measuring its distance from the atoms that contain the terminal nodes. Crucially, w e will be able to show t h a t i f a n a t o m A contains # 1 (or # 2 ) then there is an atom B of lower level than A containing such t h a t A > 1 B (respectively, A > 2 B). This means that when inductively building our decorated tree we can always choose decorations of lower level, and doing this ensures that the construction halts after nitely many steps. The following sequence of lemmas shows that F3 really does allow us to impose such a level structure on the canonical graph. We rst show b y induction that there are no empty levels. For the base case, note that as # t is an axiom, t is consistent, thus there are atoms that contain t and so L 0 is non-empty. Further note that as S 0 is just L 0 we h a ve t h a t S 0 is also non-empty. For the inductive step we show t h a t i f S i is non-empty and L i+1 exists, then L i+1 is non-empty. To see this note that for L i+1 to exist it must be the case that At( )nS i is non-empty. But then At( )nS i and S i are a pair of non-empty sets that partition At( ) thus applying lemma 4.17 we deduce that there is an atom A in At( )nS i such that A+ + W B2Si V B is consistent. But then A is in L i+1 , t h us the i+ 1 -t h l e v el is non-empty. It follows by induction that no level is empty.
But now i t is easy to see that every atom A belongs to at least one level.
For, as every level is non-empty, and as every atom belongs to at most one level, then as there are only nitely many atoms there must be a maximum level. Call this level L max . Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that there is some atom A that does not belong to any level. This means, A 6 2 S max . But this means that At( )nS max is non-empty, t h us L max+1 exists and is non-empty: a contradiction. So every atom belongs to some level. Showing that h is a sensible decoration of O is straightforward.
2
Theorem 4.21 (Completeness) Every consistent sentence has a model. Proof: Given a consistent sentence , we use the inductive construction to build a tree decorated by At(fs# g). By the previous lemma the decoration so constructed is sensible, thus by the Truth Lemma the induced model satis es s# at its root node, hence is true somewhere in this model. 2 
Consequences of completeness
The most important consequence of completeness is that validity is decidable.
Theorem 5.1 The set of valid w s is recursive. Proof: The set of w s that are not valid is recursively enumerable (r.e.). For, if a w is not valid then it is falsi able on some model. As all our models are based on nite ordered binary trees it is possible to write a procedure that systematically generates models and tests for the validity o f on the models so produced. Any s u c h procedure will eventually tell us that is not valid.
On the other hand, the set of valid w s is also r.e.. For the set of Lot proofs is obviously an r.e. set (systematically generate nite sequences of w s, discarding those that are not Lot proofs) and by the Completeness Theorem a w is valid i it is provable. As both the set of validities and its complement are r.e., the set of validities is recursive.
2
Next, recall that in section 2 we de ned a language L(L F ), the result of layering L over L F . By making use of results proved by Finger and Gabbay (1992) we will be able to see that the set of valid L(L F ) formulas is both recursively axiomatisable and decidable.
Finger and Gabbay's results are fairly general. Essentially they show how completeness and decidability results enjoyed by both languages participating in the layering process can be combined to obtain completeness and decidability results for the layered language. Now, we h a ve just established such results for L, so the next step is to ascertain that similar results hold for L F . As these results are well known (and rather simple) we only sketch the required proofs.
Suppose we h a ve xed some signature hF Ai. The following axiomatisation su ces to capture the L F w s (over this signature) that are valid on all nite, point generated feature structures. As axioms take all the w s of L F (over this signature) that are instances of the following two s c hemas:
As rules of inference take modus ponens and the rule of necessitation for each box' modality (that is, if is provable, so is f] , for all f 2 F). A formal proof in this system is a sequence of w s regulated by the axioms and rules of inference in the usual way, a n d F means that is formally provable.
To prove completeness proceed as follows. Given a consistent L F w , use Lindenbaum's Lemma to form a maximal consistent set of sentences that contains . The Feature 2 axioms guarantee that the relations in the canonical model M H for this system are partial functions, and by the usual argument M j = thus M H is a feature structure that satis es . Thus we have a (strong) completeness result for the axiomatisation with respect to the class of all feature structures. The next step is to transform M H into a nite pointgenerated feature structure that satis es and thus prove the relevant ( w eak) completeness result. This is routine. Take the submodel of M F generated by , but only generate out m steps, where m is the maximal depth of nesting of modalities in , and only generate on the relations corresponding to modalities actually occurring in . This establishes the result. It also tells us a little more. First, as the axiomatisation is complete with respect to both the class of all feature structures and the class of all nite point-generated feature structures, the two de nitions of L F validity given in section 2 must coincide. A second consequence is the decidability o f L F validity, for the generation process yields an upper bound on the size of ( nite) point generated feature structures that need to be inspected to determine 's validity.
We now have all the information about L F and L that we need to apply the results of This axiomatisation is complete for the intended semantics of L(L F ), that is, nite trees trees bred over nite point-generated feature structures. We won't prove this here it is a straightforward application of Finger and Gabbay's methods requiring no new ideas. Instead we will prove a simple corollary of completeness: our layered logic is decidable. First a lemma: Lemma 5.2 The set of validities of L(L F ) is recursively enumerable. Proof: Clearly we can write a procedure that systematically generates the nite sequences of L(L F ) w s but can we`weed out' those sequences that are not formal L(L F ) proofs? It is clear that we can write a procedure for determining whether or not a w in a putative proof sequence is licenced by t h e Tree 1 or Tree 2 clauses, thus it only remains to check that we can write a procedure for determining whether a w in a putative proof sequence is licenced by the Preserve rule. But, by the decidability result for L F , this must be the case. In short, we can recursively enumerate L(L F ) proof sequences. As this axiomatisation is complete, validity and formal provability coincide, and we have the result. To close this section we brie y discuss how to generalise these results to cover the case of models constructed over nite trees when there is a xed upper bound on the branch factor greater than 2. Recall that in section 1 we introduced suitable languages for such models: for any xed n > 2 e n r i c h L by adding operators # 3 # 4 : : : # n that look for information at 3rd, 4th, : : : , n-th daughters respectively.
A complete axiomatisation of the validities in any such language is obtained from our axiomatisation for binary branching models as follows. First, we n e e d It should be clear that the required completeness proof involves only trivial modi cation to that given for L. With this completeness result established, the decidability result for the pure tree language follows by the argument used in Theorem 5.1, and the Finger and Gabbay methods yield completeness and decidability results for the layered languages in the manner just discussed.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we established completeness and decidability results for a simple modal language L interpreted over nite trees. As we s a w, L is strong enough to be linguistically interesting, but it is natural to enquire whether similar results can be proved for stronger, or di erent, systems. To close this paper we m e n tion some extensions and variations it seems worthwhile investigating, and discuss the long term goals of this research.
First, in the literature on temporal logics of programs, it is common to dispense with # in favour of stronger operators, namely various generalisations of Kamp's Until operator see Goldblatt (1992) for de nitions and discussion.
We think it would be interesting to strengthen L in this fashion, and in addition to replace " the stronger Since operator.
A second direction worth exploring is what happens when the unbounded semantics is employed, that is, when no nite upper bound is placed on the branch factor of the allowed models. This is important if one wants to give a ǹ unbounded' GPSG style analysis of co-ordination.
An obvious language for dealing with the unbounded semantics is the following. For every natural number n add a unary operator # n for looking for information at the n-th daughter. Actually, this extension isn't quite good enough. Because there is no upper bound on the branch factor, # is no longer a de nable operator. If we w ant to be able to assert that information holds at some unspeci ed daughter (and in most linguistic applications we probably do)
we need to add # as a primitive unary modality. Let us call the language with the operators ", #, " , # and # n (for all natural numbers n) L is satis able, the whole set cannot be satis ed at any single node in any model. But to conclude the paper, let's change tack slightly. While we feel it is important t o i n vestigate extensions and variations of the type just mentioned, in certain respects they give a misleading picture of the long term goals of this work. Ultimately we hope to give a logical analysis of the leading grammar formalisms, but many aspects of this investigation are not covered by the extensions just mentioned. To close the paper we will indicate why this is so and which questions we think are worth pursuing.
As was already mentioned, the languages discussed in this paper make u s e of fairly orthodox aspects of tree structure. The operators they employ q u a n tify across relations on trees (such as mother, daughter and their transitive re exive closures) that are familiar from applications in mathematics and computer science. In linguistics, when trees are used together with a notion of feature structure, these may w ell be the only relations that need to be considered: this seems to be the case as far as GPSG is concerned. However it is probably not the case in general. In GB, for example, the feature component is minimal. Instead, various more complex relations on trees are employed. The command relations discussed earlier are one example of the relations of interest, but these are merely the tip of the iceberg. In order to do justice to GB ideas on X-bar syntax and bounding, for example, it seems that one must explore a variety o f other, less familiar, relations on trees and their interactions.
We feel that a systematic investigation of these richer structures could be rewarding. For a start, there are the more-or-less obvious logical questions: what languages are appropriate for describing these richer structures and what are their properties? But, more importantly, a precise account o f ( s a y) the GB ontology would make it possible to address more substantial issues. What, precisely, are the trade-o s between imposing more structure on trees and adopting various notions of feature structure? Can the`dynamic' notion of movement i n G B be reduced to a`static' one? Is there a canonical way of turning a GB account into (say) an LFG account and vice-versa? Di erent linguistic theories usually start from di erent pre-theoretic notions, and model these notions using very di erent mathematical ontologies. Nonetheless, mainstream syntactic theories are usually concerned with more or less the same data, and in spite of the (often vitriolic) inter-theoretic disputes, common themes are discernible. We believe that model theoretic investigations may provide a perspective from which t h e commonalities (and di erences) emerge clearly.
It hardly needs stressing that these are di cult issues, and much of the groundwork remains to be done. 6 Nonetheless, we hope we have given the reader a taste of why w e feel optimistic about the model theoretic approach t o linguistic formalisms.
